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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3 )(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I
Did the District Court err by allowing the agent/fiduciary defendants to rely
on the uncertainty created by their own wrongful act or omission to defeat the
claim of its principal(the plaintiffs) where the agent/ fiduciary's act or omission
was so inconsistent with the obligation undertaken to the principal that it
represented a tortious breach of it's contract with the principal and where the
wrongful or tortious act or omission itself made the proof of causation between the
act and the principal's damages more difficult or impossible to ascertain? The
standard of appellate review for a trial court's determinations as to standards of
proof and burden of proof is a matter of law and is reviewed for correctness.
Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co. 133 P.3d 382, 386, 2006 UT 16 (Utah,2006). The issue
was raised by the plaintiffs below in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Add 45-46.
II
Did the District Court err in granting defendant summary judgment based on
its findings that plaintiff could not prove causal relation to damages where the
-1-

judgment was based on an affidavit of a witness and the material facts upon which
defendant relied were contradicted by prior inconsistent statements of the witness
and other evidence which would not support such judgment. The standard of
review for a challenge to summary judgment presents for review only questions of
law. This Court accords no deference to trial courts' conclusions, but review them
for correctness. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization v. Tax Com'n 106 P.3d 182,
184, 2004 UT App 472

(Utah App.,2004). The plaintiffs below opposed

defendants' motions for summary judgment. Add. 132-170; 386-399.
DETERMINATIVE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 56
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to
all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered
on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 10, 2002 plaintiffs/appellants filed a complaint in the Sixth District
Court of Utah for Kane County, the Honorable David L. Mower presiding. The
verified Complaint sounded in both Contract and Tort. Add. 7-1. On December 22,
2003, a hearing was held on cross motions for summary judgment. On July 22,
-2-

2004 the Court issued a ruling denying the motions. Add 220-218. Subsequently
the case was scheduled for trial. Prior to trial, defendants renewed their motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not prove causation.
On March 13, 2006 the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to causation. It is from that March 13, 2006 Order that this appeal is
taken.
RELEVANT FACTS
On May 10, 1999, Plaintiffs/Appellants herein, by letter sent via facsimile to
Defendants/Appellees engaged the services of Defendants/Appellees Brad Adair
and Southern Utah Title Company to act as the agent for Plaintiff at a scheduled
tax sale of certain real property more particularly described as Lot 25, Plat B, Zion
View Mountain Estates, Kane County, Utah (hereinafter the "subject property").
Add. 1.
The engagement letter recited the agreement between the parties as follows:
"Southern Utah Title Co., Brad Adair and their employees and agents are hereby
retained and employed, authorized and directed to purchase by competitive bid the
property known as Lot #25, Plat B, Zion View Mountain Estates at the tax sale
scheduled for 20 May 1999. They are authorized to bid up to thirty five thousand
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dollars ($35,000.00) for the property. This agreement shall be considered to be of
a fiduciary nature." Add.l.
On May 14, 1999, Plaintiff caused to be forwarded to the Title Company the
sum of thirty five thousand dollars ($35,000.00) to be used by the Title Company
to Purchase the subject property. Add.32. On May 19, 1999, Defendant, Southern
Utah Title received the wired funds into its account. Add.31.
The tax ,sale occurred on May 20, 1999. Add. 30. The tax sale was a "cash
sale" requiring the successful bidder to pay cash for the property by 5:00p.m. the
day of the sale. Add. 152. Brad Adair and the Title Company were represented by
Ray Spencer, an employee of the Title Company. Add 26, 18. When the subject
property was auctioned, Ray Spencer failed to make a bid for the subject property
after the bid price reached eleven thousand ($11,000.00). Add. 27, 26. The Real
Property was sold to William Pringle, at the tax sale for eleven thousand, two
hundred fifty dollars ($11,250.00).

Add. 27, 26. The subject property was

subsequently resold for seventy five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). Add 118.
After suit was filed, the Defendants produced an affidavit, dated February 2,
2001, from the successful auction bidder, William C. Pringle, stating "Had the
bidding gone up to Thirty-Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), I have no doubt
that I would have bid still higher on this property...." Add. 121, 119, ]f 11.
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After Defendants produced the Affidavit of William C. Pringle, Plaintiffs
produced the affidavit of Stephen H Schwartz, dated August 27, 2003 averring
that "On May 24, 1999 I spoke with William Pringle. He told me that he would not
have bid more than $20,000.00 for the property, that he had only brought
$30,000.00 to the auction and that he had anticipated bidding on other properties.
Add. 156. Mr. Pringle did buy another property at that auction. Add 26, 28.
Additionally, Plaintiffs produced the transcript and tape recording of a
conversation of June 21, 1999 between Stephen H Schwartz and William C.
Pringle in which, Mr. Pringle acknowledged that with respect to their May 24,
1999 conversation,

"I might have said you know, I was going to quit at 20

[$20,000.00]." Add. 150, 138.
Additionally, Plaintiffs produced, from the records of the County Recorder,
an abstracted compilation of all of William C. Pringle's Kane County Tax Sale
Bids. Add. 132. The records showed that in 17 other auctions other than the one at
issue, Mr. Pringle had never bid in excess of $5,250.00 or of the 'market value' of
the property auctioned (the market value of the subject property was $8,349.00 on
the date of the auction); and that Mr. Pringle had been outbid in 6 of the 17
auctions
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Plaintiffs also produced the Minutes of the May 1999 Kane County Tax
Sale and the bid records which showed the 'market value' of the subject property
on the date of the sale; the bidding record of the sale; and the purchase by Mr.
Pringle of another property offered for sale. Add 26, 28.
William Pringle developed and traded properties as a business Add.84, 89,
296, 336.
William Pringle had a stroke on July 10, 2003 which may render him not
competent to testify. Add. 306-305.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I
The Trial Court erred in denying judgment to plaintiffs and granting the
defendants judgment because it was error to place the burden of the proof of
causation on the plaintiffs where the fiduciary and agent Defendants' failure to bid
as instructed represented a tortious breach of it's contract with it's principal and
where that same wrongful or tortious act made the proof of causation between the
act and the principal's damages more difficult or impossible to ascertain.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I
The agreement of the Defendants to bid for the Plaintiffs at the tax auction
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created the fiduciary relationship of principal to agent between the parties:
" §1. Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
§13. Agent as a Fiduciary
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.
§14. Control by Principal
A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to
matters entrusted to him.

American Law Institute. Restatement of Agency, Second
This relationship carried with it certain duties and responsibilities:
§377. Contractual Duties
A person who makes a contract with another to perform services as an agent
for him is subject to a duty to act in accordance with his promise."
§385. Duty to Obey
(1) Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to obey all
reasonable directions in regard to the manner of performing a service that he has
contracted to perform.***"
§424 Agents to Buy or Sell
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent employed to buy or sell is subject to a duty
to the principal, within the limits set by the principal's directions, to be loyal to
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the principal's interest and to use reasonable care to obtain terms which best
satisfy the manifested purposes of the principal."

American Law Institute.Restatement of Agency, Second.
The failure of the Defendants to bid as instructed created liability in the
Defendants in both tort and contract action:
§400. Liability for Breach of Contract
An agent who commits a breach of his contract with his principal is subject to
liability to the principal
§401. Liability for Loss Caused
An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by any breach of
duty.
Comment:
a. Action of tort or on the contract of employment The relation between
principal and agent is always consensual but not always contractual...[I]f a paid
agent does something wrongful, either knowing it to be wrong or acting
negligently, the principal may have an either an action of tort or an action of
contract. Id.

Utah employs a three part test in breach of contract actions:
"First, plaintiff must establish that a legal right has been invaded. Second,
plaintiff must establish that there is a causal connection between the legal wrong
suffered and the damages claimed. Gould v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 6 Utah 2d 187, 193, 309 P.2d 802, 805 (1957); Terry v. Panek,
-8-

631 P.2d 896, 897 (1981). Third, Plaintiff must demonstrate the amount of
damages with sufficient certainty to permit the factfinder to make an award,
although damages need not be proven with precision. Winsness v M.J. Conoco
Distributors, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1979); 5A Corbin, Contracts, §
1022(1964)."

Turtle Mgmt, Inc. v. Haggis Mgrnt, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah, 1982).
The failure of Defendants to act as instructed (ie., to continue to bid until
the bid price reached thirty five thousand dollars) represents the "legal invasion"
or breach of Plaintiffs right to expect action in conformity with their express
instructions. The Trial Court correctly found that the Plaintiffs' had met their
burden in this regard in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
liability.
With regard to the issue of causal connection; it is clear that the failure of
Defendant Spencer to bid caused Plaintiff to lose any opportunity to purchase the
property. This same wrongful act or omission created uncertainty in fact as to what
the property would have sold for had the Defendants bid as instructed. Without the
continued bidding of Spencer, the bidding ceased; hence it is not known what the
ultimate selling price would have been had the Spencer not breached the contract.
The Court below found that "...Plaintiffs have not offered evidence sufficiently
probative which tends to prove the proposition that for some sum of money up to
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and including the sum of $35,000.00, Plaintiffs would have been the prevailing
bidders..." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, March 13, 2006.
Add.461,18.
Plaintiffs urge this Court to find that the lower court erred in placing the
burden of proof as to what the sales price would have been upon the Plaintiff in
this case because the very uncertainty in this regard was caused by the wrongful
act of the Defendants. Although the general rule is that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof as to all elements of its case including causality, Sumsion v.
Streator-Smitk Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943), courts have long held that
the burden of loss in situations such as the one sub judice rests with Defendants,
not Plaintiffs:
"the most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer [] bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created...
the wrongdoer may not object to the plaintiffs reasonable estimate of the cause
of injury and of its amount, supported by the evidence, because not based on
more accurate data which the wrongdoer's misconduct has rendered
unavailable." Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265, 90 L.Ed 652,
660-661 (1946) (emphasis added).
"... it is not the privilege of him whose wrongful act caused the loss to hide
behind the uncertainties inherent in the very situation his wrong has created...."
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Wycko v. Gnodke936l Mich. 331, 105 N.W. 2d 118 (1960); Wilson v. Wylie, 86
N.M. 9, 518 P.2d 1213, 1223 (1974) [concurring opinion]."
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully request this Honorable
Court reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions that the District
Court grant plaintiffs a presumption that had the Defendants not tortiously
breached their contract with Plaintiffs, that the Plaintiffs would have successfully
purchased the property at the next bidding increment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
II
The Court below erred in granting Defendant summary judgment because
the record contains evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer that had the
Defendants bid as instructed, Plaintiffs would have successfully purchased the
property within the limits of the instruction accepted by Defendants.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
II

Utah courts do not favor the granting of summary judgment when the issue
is one of causation:
"...questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are generally for the
fact-trier, court or jury, to determine. [State v. Standard Oil Co., 3 Ariz.App.
-11-

389, 414 P.2d 992 (1966); Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County, 158 Mont. 369,
492 P.2d 926 (1971); LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash.2d 154, 531 P.2d 299
(1975).| \ part) should not be deprived of the privilege of having such an
adjudication of his claims unless it appears that even upon the facts claimed by
hum In

null I not establish a basis for rccoven | St i Richards v. Anderson, 9

Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 59 (1959); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, Utah, 542 P.2d 191
(1975).] Moreover, when there is doubt about the matter, it should be resolved
in favor oi permitting the part> to go to trial. [Butler v. Sports Haven
International, Utah, 563 P.2d 1245 (1977)]."
Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 58 ' I1 Id 130, 133 (Utah, 1978).
"Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law."
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d w/ 106 (Utah 1992). "Proximate cause is an
issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate." Harline v. Barker,
854 P M s»Sb, 000 (Utah \|i|> ) i citations omitted), cert, denied, 862 P M 135b
(Utah 1993). In other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element
of causation on summary judgment.
...Utah courts have recognized that "[f]act-sensitive cases ... do not lend
themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v. Estate of
BernardoM% P.2d 1097,1101 (Utahl995).The Utah Supreme Court recently
pointed out that M[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not
weigh disputed evidence and its sole inquiry shouM hr ^ h 'ihei man ual issues
of fact exist." Id. at 1100. The court also observed that "[i]t is not the purpose
-12-

of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties
the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate
the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts
as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Id.
at 1101 (quoting Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)).
Moreover, " VY only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.'" Id.
(quoting Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 193)."
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App., 1996).

In the case under consideration, the court below determined that a sworn
statement of the witness, William C. Pringle, signed two years after the sale, that
he would have bid more than the Defendants were authorized to bid conclusive as
to the issue of causation. In granting summary judgment, the lower court of
necessity had to find that facts and inferences supporting the Plaintiffs' claim did
not rise to the level of materiality.
The sworn statement of the Plaintiff that the witness, William C. Pringle had
told him only five days after the auction he had taken only $30,000.00 to the
auction and that he would have bid only $20,000.00 on the property. The
statements are admissible as both prior inconsistent statements, and, if the witness
appears to testify, substantive evidence. UTAH R. EVID., Rule 801(d)(1); State v.
-13-
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m.Tpretatior I of

the evidence is that Mr. Pringle is a value shopper, not one who is likely to bid
more than four times the market value of a property (which he would have had to
do in order to be the successful bidder had the Defendants not breached the
contract). Appellants submit that this is the type of fact intensive determination
that is better left to the trier of fact than the court in a summary judgment
proceeding.
The lower court found that the evidence as to the issue of proximate cause
would lead to conjecture and cited Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 2003 UT App 438, (Utah App, 2003). App. 462, Para 5. Indeed
as this Court said in Thurston, "(cl)emonstrating material issues of fact with
respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment
if there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that
alleged negligence and the injury." Id., 83 P.3d at 395-396. Here however, unlike
Thurston and Sums ion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943),
(also cited by the lower Court) the evidence is clear that the loss occasioned by the
Plaintiffs was directly the result of the failure of the Defendants to bid.
Once Defendant Spencer tortiously breached the contract by ceasing to bid
as instructed, the loss of the property was a foregone conclusion. The inference
clearly available is that but for his failure to bid, the Plaintiff would have

-15-

pi 11 cl lased tl ic pi opei ty

1 1 le successful bidder's various statements as to what h e

would have bid are at best questions to be sorted by the trier of fact. Those
statements do itot lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the Defendants' acts and
omissions were not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' loss. Any further amount
that the third party bidder (IV li , Prii igle) would I lave bid was put at risk of pi oof by
Defendai its by 1:1 ieii: faili it. ,:" t : bid,
"The negligence of the defendant cannot be excluded as one of the
actual causes of the accider

\ss it can be said with certainty that,

even if the defendant had not been negligent, the accident would
nevertheless have happened. It is not enough to speculate "that the
same harm might possibly have been sustained had the actor not
been negligent." (Emphasis added).

Restate(

:

r

of Torts. £

:

:

Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co., 623 F.2d 240 5 247 (2d

Cir. 1980). Plaintiff was burned w h e n she inadvertently brushed perspiration from
her face with a hand that h a d highly caustic liquid resin hardening agent. T h e
appeal from t h e trial j u d g e ' s refusal to grant a directed verdict or N O V involved
the adequacy of warnings on the resin container. 1 1 101 is ii i tl ic c ot itaii ici did :oi itain
warnings conce*
that 1:1; le warnings i a r

-

*

*= »ry was

to warn of the severity of the burn. Defendant's

unsuccessful argument was that even though it was negligent, failure to provide

-16-

adequate warnings was not the cause of the inadvertent touching that caused the
burn; Smith v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 856 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 1988),
Plaintiff, injured by co-employee claimed employer's negligence in not reporting
or disciplining co-employee for violent behavior caused employee to shoot and
injure plaintiff. Trial court's grant of NOV reversed; employer's negligence could
not, as a matter of law be found not to have been a cause of plaintiff s injuries.
Plummer v. McCall, 179 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763-764 (1958); Rigg v. State, 284
A.D179, 131 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (1954).
The facts of this case, those things which actually occurred, are not in the
least bit speculative. A Defendant failed to bid as instructed. The next bid was
within the range of the defendant's authority. It was the defendant's failure to bid
which caused the bidding to end, not the bidding of William Pringle. As a matter
of fact there was no event or actor which intervened between the defendant's
failure to act and the end of the auction.
An independent intervening agent such as to break the casual connection
...must be (1) independent, self created, not itself the product of the wrongful
act; (2) it must intervene; (3) "It must divert and not merely hasten natural
effect of the wrong." (emphasis added).

Ehalt v. McCarthy 138 P.2d 639, 646 (Utah 1943) citing Bohlen on Torts, page 29.

-17-

Finaly, the lower Court found that because of the speculative nature of what
the third party bidder would have bid had the auction continued, damages were too
speculative and the claim must fail. Add 462, Para 6. Of course, this would mean
that any claim for breach of this type of contract must also iai> i he law of I Jtah
does n(
allows

:. .

i a resi:

he a war

leen establisl led I Jtah

images, even in llle absence of exact determinatioii, if

reasonable minds could reasonably determine the evidence to support them.
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah, 1984)
Cook Associates Inc. v Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); Terry v. Pane, 631 P.
2d 896 (Utah, 1981); Winsness v. M

J

^onoco Distributors, Inc., 593 J\ Id I KM

(Utah, 1979); Dunn v Mackay% Burto;
(Utah, 1978). Appellai it:

•-

-. • rray and Thermion.
'

:

N- '

\\ S()4

a damages, again, it woulu be

inequitable to allow the appellees to afford themselves the advantage of the same
wrongful act which constituted the tortious breach of their contract with appellants
to avoid the payment of damages.
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully

request

this

11 ( ) r i o t a b 1 e ( "'""'o i 11 1 re v er s e 11 i e j i i d g I i: i e n t o f th e D i str i c t C ' c > i 11 t a I i d i e n. \ a i i d 11 i e m a tter
for a ti ial or i tl ic i i ici; its.

Respectfully submitted this

l

day of August, 2006.

Stepnen H Schwartz
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